Sayers claims that maintaining market control was a major policy concern during the interwar gold standard. Sayers's revelations, however, have received scant attention in the voluminous literature on interwar monetary policy, perhaps because he attempted no quantitative analysis of market-control problems nor proffered an explanation of how they were overcome. For example, Barry Eichengreen refers to market control only briefly in his extensive writings on interwar monetary and exchange policies. In a model explaining changes in Bank Rate, the Bank of England's discount rate, he writes: "since the Bank of England apparently was concerned with the relationship of Bank Rate to market interest rates, we enter BR -i as a separate variable. "2 The qualifier "apparently" serves notice that the concern is doubted-as
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Garrett and nominal variables. With this data the expectations formation assumptions in the new classical macroeconomics can be probed with a simplicity and robustness heretofore impossible.
The new classical model of optimal monetary policy (hereafter referred to as the credibility model) has generated a large literature.6 The credibility model endorses what would have been a radical policy notion in the 40 years following the Great Depression: that it is inappropriate for central banks to offset economic contractions. However, some key theoretical assumptions necessary for this policy conclusion are contradicted by the behavior of British financial markets during the interwar gold standard. As the credibility model influences current monetary policy and has received little empirical testing, this is an important result.
This article describes the difficulties of market control and then details Norman's remedies. It then presents a model of market control containing both quantity-of-reserves and expectations channels of monetary policy. The model is then estimated, and the results are interpreted. Those results contradict the credibility model.
MARKET CONTROL: THE PROBLEM
Contemporaries assumed that the control of market interest rates was unproblematic, given the official published balance sheet of the Bank of England. A contractionary open-market operation-the sale of securities from the Bank's portfolio-could have drained bank reserves, driving market interest rates towards Bank Rate.7 During the period from 1925 to 1931 the reserves of the London clearing banks (till money and bankers' balances) seldom strayed from a narrow 180-to 200-million pound range, with the total for all banks about ?40 million higher.8 The Bank of England's reported portfolio of marketable securities never fell below ?55 million, and was usually in the 65-to 100-million pound range, making it appear that bank reserves, and therefore interest rates, were firmly in hand.9
The ratio of reserves to deposits did not exhibit substantial short-run variation, with the exception of biannual episodes of window dressing. 10 Therefore a decline in reserves of several million pounds was sufficient to snug market rates upwards toward Bank Rate. The Bank's own estimate, provided by Ernest M. Harvey, the Deputy Governor, in evidence to the Macmillan Committee, was that a drain of five million 615 pounds of reserves was sufficient "to do the trick.""" As the Bank reported that it always had more than ten times that much on hand in its securities portfolio, market control would seem to have been a Table 2 ). 32 Brown, Gold Standard, p. 202. The quantitatively least important method of market control was using confidential special time deposits from individual financial institutions to take reserves off the market. Special deposits had to be substantial and secret, as the Bank was claiming in its published figures that it had no reason to resort to special deposits to drain reserves. Thus special deposits were difficult to use as a regular policy tool (see Table 1 ). Although special deposits were used only three times, each instance came during a period of market-control difficulties (see Figure 2) .
Monetary Policy and Expectations
Coordination of the public finances resulted from the Bank's influence over Treasury officials, which is an inversion of the "normal" mechanism found in the central bank independence literature.34 As documented by Susan Howson the "treasury knights," a group of powerful senior civil servants, overtly supported the policy of deflation and the independence of the Bank of England from the government. They sided with the Bank against their bosses, the Chancellors of the Exchequer, whose relations with the Bank were often difficult irrespective of party affiliation.35 These civil servants had the power to aid Norman greatly through their conduct of the public finances. Public deposits (the government's account at the Bank) increased during the period of gold inflows. From 1926: 1 to 1928: 2 the increase in public deposits and a small decline in discounting produced a ?17.3-million decline in the monetary base (see Table 1 ). As the open-market portfolio was completely exhausted by 1928: 2 (see Table 2 ), contractionary monetary policy could not have been maintained otherwise. However, there were limits to such help, as padding the Treasury's balance at the bank required issuing more Treasury bills than necessary, which cost the taxpayer, and was therefore certain to draw inconvenient questions from the Chancellor of the Exchequer. The Control of Expectations There were three steps in Norman's new policy channel. First, he convinced the markets that he could and would set market rates, and that failure to correctly judge his intentions would be costly. Second, he focused the market's attention on gold flows as the primary forecast variable for monetary policy. The last step was the boldest but the easiest to carry out: Norman simply made up whatever gold flows were convenient for market control. The first step was accomplished by overstating the size of the open-market portfolio. The cost of failure to judge policy correctly is described below.
The second step was actuated through the frequently repeated (and wholly disingenuous) assertion that the Bank would mechanically adjust monetary policy to follow the rules of the classic gold-standard game.38 A gold cushion of ?150 million was declared the minimum safe level by the Cunliffe Committee in 1918 and was accepted by financial markets and academic economists as the lower constraint after the return to gold. A gold stock of around ?150 million coupled with a gold outflow indicated an increase in Bank Rate was likely. Although actual gold holdings were usually substantially above ?150 million, Norman chose to publish figures that seldom strayed from the minimum safe level by more than a few million pounds, maximizing the leverage of reported gold flows on market interest rates.
The September 1927 confrontation between Norman and the discount houses illustrates the explicit connection between profitability and 36 Sayers, Bank, pp. 217-19. 37 Using monthly data and one million pounds as the discrepancy threshold the seven possible cases were reported n times: inflows underreported (n = 24); inflows overreported (n = 10); outflows underreported (n = 7); outflows overreported (n = 9); outflows misreported as inflows (n = 4); inflows misreported as outflows (n = 9); correct reports (n = 16) (author's calculations from Sayers, Bank, vol. 3, pp. 349-55). 38 To restore reserves the London clearing banks would call in their overnight money, the chief source of finance for the discount market's bill portfolio. To pay off their call-loan borrowing, the discount houses would be forced "into the Bank," forced to discount their portfolios at Bank Rate, a full 2 percent above the call-money rate.4' Thus Norman was threatening to force the discount houses to liquidate their highly leveraged portfolios at rates 3 percent above those contemplated when the portfolios were purchased (the 2 percent differential between call money and Bank Rate plus a 1 percent increase in Bank Rate). Given the thin margins and low capital levels in the discount business, this would have produced severe losses. Despite Norman's weekly meetings with the discount houses' governing body, he waited to deliver his ultimatum until the pound's seasonal autumn weakness, when the market was already nervous about an increase in Bank Rate, five months after the market-control incident began.42 Why Norman had simply not drained sufficient liquidity out of the market at the time of the incident was probably puzzling to the discount houses, but the dire consequences of Norman's threat made it unlikely that anyone would call his bluff, if anyone could have even conceived that he was bluffing. In fact, he was. His portfolio was empty. with the reserve-to-deposit ratio at time t, RD,, set equal to a trend value, RDt -n-aon, where aO is the monthly long-term trend change in RD calculated from a base time period of t -n. The long-term trend reflects a decline in RD caused by changes in banking technology, payment habits, especially the spread of checking, the sec;ular evolution of risk-taking behavior by banks, the evolution of depositors' riskaversion preferences, and the state of financial market regulation, to name the most important factors. These long-term trend factors are commonly assumed to be independent of monetary policy and of constant cumulative effect through the period, giving rise to the constant or constant-trend money multiplier.43 However, monetary policy will cause a deviation from the trend by altering the short-run profit-maximizing RD ratio. Three mechanisms through which monetary policy necessarily alters the optimal short-run RD ratio are the opportunity cost of holding reserves; maturity transformation; and costly portfolio adjustment. The first mechanism implies that the RD ratio is negatively related to the opportunity cost of holding reserves, which is measured by the Bank prime bill rate (hereafter BL).
Maturity transformation, with the term structure of bank assets longer than liabilities, causes the current period RD ratio to be positively related to an expected increase in future BL rates. For example, if BL rates are expected to increase then it may be optimal to postpone the acquisition of earning assets and increase reserves until after rates go up. Costly portfolio adjustment, with nonlinearities so that the total cost of adjustment is less if accomplished gradually, implies that A test for asymmetrical nonlinearity in the reaction of BR -BL to gold flows is conducted through the slope dummy variable GOLD2, which is the square of negative observations of the sum of GOLD12 and GOLD3. It is positively related to the BR -BL spread, indicating a nonlinearity, in other words, a single very large reported gold outflow had less effect on market rates than a steady drain. There was no evidence that the relationship was symmetrical, possibly because very large gold inflows were not often reported in the period.
The market response to conflicting information from the gold flow variables was tested with the slope dummy CONFLICT. The market had a significant and substantial optimistic bias, which highlights the depth of the market-control problem. If 12-month gold was positive (an inflow) and three-month gold negative, then the 12-month gold coefficient would roughly double, virtually canceling the negative impact of the short-term outflow. In the opposite case the 12-month coefficient drops close to zero; the negative 12-month gold flow was ignored, allowing the positive short-term inflow to lower rates. Figure 2 shows the behavior of the BR -BL spread and the fit obtained from regression 3 (the results reported in Table 3 , column 3). All the regressions in Table 3 produce quite similar traces. Regression 3 is chosen for detailed interpretation because of the more conservative specification for the expected decline in Bank Rate dummy variable. However, all four of the regressions produce the same qualitative conclusions discussed below.
Interpretation
From regression 3 the coefficient on RD4 indicates that a ?1-million open-market operation caused a 2.46 basis point change in market rates.50 The GOLD coefficients show that purporting a one-million pound gold flow produced a 1.82 basis point change in market rates. The response of market rates to published gold alone, without any change in the level of reserves, is remarkable, as it is almost as large as that produced by an actual open-market operation of equivalent size. In addition the high t-statistics on the gold flow coefficients indicate that the market response was consistent and fairly precise.5' It could readily be used as a channel for monetary policy. I For example, see Keynes, "Amalgamation." 50 For example a ?10 million open-market purchase will add ?10 million to both the numerator and denominator of the RD ratio. This will increase RD4 by a maximum value of 0.001707 after four months, using the average levels of reserves and deposits for the period.
s' See the note for 
THE SPREAD BETWEEN BANK RATE AND MARKET RATES ACTUAL (BR -BL) AND PREDICTED (REGRESSION 3)
Note: Regression 3 refers to the results reported in Table 3 , column 3. Garrett bankers will create an inflationary surprise to reach an above fullemployment output target and set their period ahead price level expectations accordingly.59 Given this expectation, the central bank can either validate the expected inflation, with output remaining at full employment, or can surprise the market with a noninflationary policy, causing a blip downward along the Friedman-Lucas supply curve.60 Welfare losses result, either through the central bank's inflation bias or an output loss. However, through repeated forbearance, the central bank can teach the market that it has forsworn inflationary surprises. In other words, it can build up a credible record as an inflation fighter. This establishes a "reputational equilibrium" that solves the time inconsistency problem, because credibility, or, rather, the lower steady state inflation rate it permits, is more valuable to the central bank than a one-period output enhancement.61 To maintain credibility the central bank must cease stabilizing the economy, lest this be interpreted as an attempt at an inflationary surprise.
Expectations play a crucial, specific, and simple role in the credibility model. They are not independent of policy but always react against policy to minimize the effect of expected policy on the real equilibrium.
The real equilibrium is autonomous and is independent of policy.62
Expectations are the market mechanism that makes policy ineffective. In the new classical macroeconomics, expectations are strictly beyond the reach of policy makers.
The findings presented here, however, indicate that expectations play a more complex role than specified by new classical economists. Given the institutional arrangements of British financial markets during the return to gold, expectations had little or no tendency in the short run to enforce a real equilibrium that was policy invariant. On the contrary, expectations were manipulated at will by the Bank of England, successfully and repeatedly driving the market hither and yon. Expectations manipulation was more than merely statistically significant: the empirical results show that from the middle of 1926 onwards it was quantitatively as or more important in the execution of monetary policy than changes in the monetary base (see Figure 2) .
Admittedly the institutional arrangements of the interwar gold standard, to say nothing of Montagu Norman, were unique. However, in the credibility model the general case of a central bank that lies is specifically considered, and the conclusion is reached that lying has no effect The results may be summarized as follows. Markets can not tell when a central bank is lying. They then have the option to accept all or reject all forecast information emanating from the central bank. Under such circumstances the credibility model asserts that private financial markets reject all central bank information. This is possible because the financial markets' private information is assumed to be almost complete. However, the results presented here contradict this assumption and lend support to the opposite case: the markets' private information is so incomplete that they can not dispense with central-bank sources. The implication for the credibility model is devastating because pervasive ignorance and uncertainty allow the central bank to maintain its position as a disseminator of forecast information even if the central bank is guilty of extreme dishonesty, as under NQrman. Under these circumstances monetary policy will be an effective instrument to stabilize the economy against both money demand and real shocks, which contradicts the core result found in the large and influential credibility-model literature. Recently support has increased for Kindleberger's "internationalness" hypothesis and in particular the role played by the internationally shared characteristics of the macroeconomic policy system. The three most important features of the macroeconomic policy system were fiscal policy constraints through balanced budget policy rules or laws; the independent central bank as the uncontested policy authority; and 63 The results presented here provide evidence that the monetary policies of the Bank of England in the early years of the Great Depression were consistent with the policy regime, and that, if anything, the policies were slightly less contractionary than indicated by the norms of the 1920s. Although further qualitative and quantitative analysis is required, this finding indicates an inconsistency between the new classical model and the conclusion of economic historians that monetary policy mattered in the Great Depression.
Finally, the behavior of British financial markets is shown to be inconsistent with the microfoundations of the new classical modelexpectations not only moved in a policy reinforcing rather than a policy negating direction, but expectations became a reliable, systematic policy instrument. One of Thomas Sargent's hopes is fulfilled-economic history proves to be fertile ground for testing the accuracy of complex macroeconomic theory-though the outcome is probably not what he had expected. 71 Sargent, Rational Expectations; for contra see Garrett, "Economic Policy."
